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 NOTE 
Dueling Decisions: The Wrongful Death 
Clock Clangs Twice on the Same Day 
Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health System, Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703 (Mo. 2015) (en 
banc). 
STACEY ANN LANNERT* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Hard cases . . . are apt to introduce bad law.”1  This maxim concerning 
hard cases is an apt description of what may be a first in the Supreme Court 
of Missouri’s history: dueling decisions issued on the exact same day.2  On 
August 18, 2015, the court issued contradictory opinions centered on the stat-
utory interpretation of the wrongful death statute of limitations.3  Both cases 
display polar opposite outcomes to the question of whether fraudulent con-
cealment by tortious defendants defeats meritorious claims brought beyond a 
three-year statute of limitations in wrongful death cases. 
Two contradictory lines of reasoning have developed in Missouri 
wrongful death causes of action.4  The clashing decisions demonstrate the 
collision of strict interpretation and liberal construction and serve to illumi-
nate the difficulty that dominates the issue.  In Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health 
Systems, Inc., the court applied strict construction interpretation standards to 
 
* B.S., Southeast Missouri State University, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Mis-
souri School of Law, 2017.  Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–
2017.  I would like to sincerely thank Professor Brad Desnoyer for his assistance and 
direction with this Note, Dean Robert Bailey for his guidance and encouragement, 
and my friends and loved ones for their patience and support. 
 1. Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 713 (Mo. 2015) 
(en banc) (citing Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.)). 
 2. See id.; State ex rel. Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d 434 (Mo. 2015) (en banc); 
Rick Montgomery, Missouri Supreme Court Ruling Blocks Lawsuit Over Deaths at 
Chillicothe Hospital, KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.kansascity.com/
news/business/health-care/article32747469.html. 
 3. See generally Boland, 471 S.W.3d 703; Beisly, 469 S.W.3d 434. 
 4. Compare Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 708 (barring equitable estoppel in wrongful 
death actions concerning defendant’s use of fraudulent concealment), and Frazee v. 
Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Mo. 1958) (en banc) (finding that wrongful death 
statutes do not provide for the tolling of statutes due to fraudulent concealment), with 
Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 444 (allowing equitable estoppel to bar the defense of time 
limitations), and O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.3d 904, 907–08 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) 
(creating a liberal construction standard for wrongful death statutory interpretation). 
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bar the plaintiffs from filing a wrongful death suit due to time limitations.5  
Conversely, the court in Beisly v. Perigo applied a liberal construction stand-
ard and injected a judicially-created common law maxim, equitable estoppel, 
to bar the defense of a statutory time limitation when the defendants engaged 
in fraudulent concealment.6 
Even though the contrary opinions were factually dissimilar,7 the hearts 
of both cases beat identically in that the defendants allegedly employed inten-
tional and fraudulent concealment of the facts, which made it impossible for 
the plaintiffs to bring their respective wrongful death suits within the statute 
of limitations.  Both cases held that a cause of action for wrongful death was 
a “purely” statutory creation.8  Both cases attempted to decipher the intent 
and plain language of the legislature9 so as to untangle fraudulent conceal-
ment entwined in the hands of the wrongful death clock in order to properly 
determine when time started or accrued10 and when time should freeze or 
toll.11  Both cases were also closely decided by a 4-3 majority.12  However, 
the Beisly decision was only made possible due to the recusal of a Supreme 
Court of Missouri judge and the participation of a Special Judge from the 
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District.13  For purposes of this 
Note, Boland will be the focus.14 
Part II of this Note provides the facts and holding in Boland.  Part III 
presents the legal background of Boland, discusses both the statutory and 
common law origins of wrongful death causes of action, and explores Mis-
souri’s unique history of wrongful death statutory interpretation.  Part IV 
analyzes the rationale of the Boland court’s return to the strict interpretation 
standard of days past.  Finally, Part V discusses the ramifications of the 
 
 5. 471 S.W.3d at 709. 
 6. 469 S.W.3d at 444. 
 7. Boland involved the alleged fraudulent acts of a hospital in an attempt to 
conceal alleged intentional acts of an employee.  471 S.W.3d at 705.  Beisly centered 
on the murder of a woman allegedly killed by her husband and another man who hid 
their involvement in the crime.  469 S.W.3d. at 436. 
 8. Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 455 (Russel, J., dissenting). 
 9. See id. at 445 (majority opinion); Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 707. 
 10. As stated by the court in Beisly, “[g]enerally, ‘[a] cause of action accrues . . . 
when the right to sue arises.’”  Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 437 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Hunter v. Hunter, 237 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo. 1951)). 
 11. Tolling “occurs when a party shows facts that act to remove or interrupt the 
bar of the statute of limitations to a cause of action.”  Id. at 437 (citing 2 MO. 
PRACTICE SERIES, Methods of Practice: Litigation Guide § 5.9 (4th ed. 2002)). 
 12. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 713; Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 445. 
 13. Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 445 (Fischer, J., dissenting).  The Missouri Court of 
Appeals for the Western District heard Boland.  Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., 
Inc., No. WD75364, 2013 WL 6170598 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013), aff’d, 471 
S.W.3d 703. 
 14. The action in Beisly involved a writ of prohibition compared to a grant of 
transfer found in Boland; therefore, Beisly presents the opportunity to reappear before 
the court.  See Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 446 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
2
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court’s decision and explores why the court should have acknowledged 
wrongful death claims that ascended from common law. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Five people seeking treatment at a Chillicothe, Missouri hospital died in 
2002.15  The family members alleged a rogue nurse16 employed by the hospi-
tal was responsible for the deaths.17  The nurse, Jennifer Hall,18 purportedly 
dosed the patients with lethal amounts of unneeded medication19 and, there-
fore, caused the decedents’ deaths.20  A minimum of nine suspicious deaths 
and eighteen suspicious “codes”21 were attributed to the nurse.22  
Dr. Cal Greenlaw became suspicious when a patient in the emergency 
room suddenly “coded” for cardiovascular collapse, and Dr. Greenlaw could 
not explain “the patient’s unusual blood sugar/insulin events.”23  This event, 
combined with Dr. Greenlaw’s knowledge of two previous suspicious inci-
dents, led the doctor to voice concerns to the hospital administration – 
twice.24  The doctor’s concerns were met with a denial of the problem, an 
admonishment to remain silent, and a command to abandon the issue out of 
fear this news would affect hospital enrollment.25  One hospital administrator 
said, “We don’t have a problem here, and if anyone breathes a word of this, 
 
 15. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 705.  The deceased were treated at Hedrick Medical 
Center in Chillicothe, Missouri.  Id. 
 16. Specifically, a respiratory therapist.  Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Hall has an interesting background: she was convicted and later exonerated 
of setting a fire at a previous place of employment.  Rick Montgomery, Hospital 
Deaths Cast a Shadow Over Jennifer Hall, KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 28, 2015), 
http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article32652306.html. 
 19. Specifically, succinylcholine, insulin, and/or other medication.  Boland, 471 
S.W.3d at 705, 720 n.2.  Succinylcholine, a muscle relaxant that paralyzes the respira-
tory muscles, is usually used when inserting breathing tubes for conscious patients.  
Id.  Succinylcholine can be fatal when given in large doses, as the patient will suffo-
cate to death due to paralysis.  Id. 
 20. Id. at 705. 
 21. Codes are “medical emergencies, often involving cardiac arrest or the inabil-
ity to breath.”  Id. 
 22. Id.  The respiratory therapist had not been officially charged as of August 28, 
2015.  Rick Montgomery, Missouri Supreme Court Ruling Blocks Lawsuit Over 
Deaths at Chillicothe Hospital, KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 29, 2015), 
http://www.kansascity.com/news/business/health-care/article32747469.html. 
 23. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 706. 
 24. Id.  On the first occasion, Dr. Greenlaw told the hospital’s director of nurses, 
and on the second occasion, he told the hospital’s administrator.  Id. 
 25. Id. 
3
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you’ll be fired.”26  The doctor disregarded the administration and gathered 
evidence that pointed to eighteen code blues and nine suspicious deaths that 
occurred while the nurse was on duty.27  Dr. Greenlaw contacted local author-
ities.28 
Aleta Boyd, a registered nurse and the hospital’s internal risk manager, 
detected a “dramatic increase in code blue events and deaths” in March 
2002.29  Boyd began an investigation after she suspected patients were inten-
tionally injected with unnecessary insulin.30  Boyd determined Hall was the 
perpetrator and reported the findings to both the director of nursing and the 
hospital’s administrator.31  Similar to Dr. Greenlaw’s experiences, Boyd was 
met with a directive to remain quiet.  However, like Dr. Greenlaw, Boyd con-
tinued to investigate.32 Boyd uncovered “approximately 15 patients who ei-
ther coded or died under suspicious circumstances,” and Hall attended to each 
patient.33  Boyd and other concerned nurses threatened to alert the media if 
the hospital “failed to stop Hall.”34 
In May 2002, Hall was suspended and eventually fired after yet another 
patient expired under suspicious conditions.35  A post-suspension investiga-
tion of Hall’s locker revealed a bottle of insulin, even though Hall could not 
give a legitimate explanation for the insulin’s presence.36  After Hall’s termi-
nation, the suspicious codes and deaths stopped.37 
An independent investigation was conducted by the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and concluded a number of 
“sentinel” events occurred during 2002.38  The Supreme Court of Missouri 
defined a “sentinel” event as “an unexpected occurrence involving death or 
serious physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof.”39  Healthcare 
providers must report notice of sentinel events to patients and their families.40  
However, the families of the deceased reported they were not notified of the 
 
 26. Brief of Appellant Sherri Lynn Harper, as Spouse of Deceased David Harper 
at 5, Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., No. WD 75366, 2013 WL 6170598 
(Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013) (No. WD 75366), 2013 WL 623705, at *5. 
 27. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 706. 
 28. Brief of Appellant Sherri Lynn Harper, supra note 26, at *5. 
 29. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 706. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
4
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sentinel events suspected in connection with the deaths, despite the hospital’s 
duty to do so, until shortly before their petitions were filed in 2010.41 
The families filed separate petitions for damages under the wrongful 
death statute, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 537.080.42  The hospital ar-
gued the claims were time-barred by Missouri Revised Statutes Section 
537.100,43 the three-year wrongful death statute of limitations, and the hospi-
tal filed motions for judgment on the pleadings.44  The trial court granted 
summary judgment for the hospital because the claims were filed eight years 
after the deaths, five years past the statute of limitations.45 
On joint appeal, the families of the deceased46 contended that the trial 
court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of the hospital 
because the wrongful death statute of limitations time-bar should not have 
been applicable due to the hospital’s fraudulent concealment.47  The families 
argued two main points concerning why the statute of limitations did not ap-
ply in this case; both points centered on the inability to ascertain a cause of 
action for wrongful death because the families were unaware that tortious 
conduct, instead of natural causes, contributed to the deaths.48  First, the fami-
lies argued that the hospital’s fraudulent concealment49 stopped the clock or 
 
 41. Id. at 706–07.  See Brief of Appellant Helen Pittman, Natural Sister of Dece-
dent, Shirley R. Eller at 4, Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., No. WD 75366, 
2013 WL 6170598 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013) (No. WD75485), 2013 WL 
1234150, at *4. 
 42. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (2000); Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 707. 
 43. § 537.100. 
 44. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 707. 
 45. Id.; see Brief of Appellant Helen Pittman, supra note 41, at *4. 
 46. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 705, 707–8.  The families appealed, and the separate, 
but “essentially identical,” appeals were consolidated.  Id. 
 47. Substitute Brief of Appellants at 12, Boland, 471 S.W.3d 703 (Mo. 2015) (en 
banc) (No. SC 93906), 2014 WL 3706773, at *12. 
 48. Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., No. WD75364, 2013 WL 6170598, 
at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013), aff’d, 471 S.W.3d 703. 
 49. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 705–06.  The families alleged the hospital fraudulent-
ly concealed Hall’s actions because it: (1) threatened and coerced employees of 
Hedrick to conceal information concerning the actions of Hall; (2) failed to request 
autopsies so as to conceal the true causes of the patients’ deaths when they knew a 
number of deaths were suspicious; (3) informed and/or instructed Hedrick employees 
to intentionally mislead the patients’ families that the causes of death were “natural” 
instead of caused by Hall; (4) disbanded committees previously put in place by 
Hedrick to evaluate “codes” and determine preventative measures; (5) failed to in-
form pertinent individuals and relevant medical communities about Hall’s intentional 
and/or negligent battery of patients; (6) failed to investigate and/or monitor Hall when 
requested to do so by law enforcement; (7) made patients’ medical records inaccessi-
ble to their physicians by removing the records; (8) discarded and/or failed to pre-
serve crucial material evidence contained in Hall’s locker pertaining to her intentional 
and/or negligent batteries; and (9) impeded the investigation of Hall by law enforce-
ment.  Id. 
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“tolled” the statute of limitations.50  Second, the families argued that due to 
fraudulent concealment, the cause of action for wrongful death did not accrue 
at the time of death, but rather began when “the causes of death became evi-
dent or reasonably ascertainable.”51 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District reversed the 
judgment on the pleadings and remanded for further proceedings.52  The ap-
pellate court reasoned “tolling” could not apply due to the legislature’s crea-
tion of a special time limitation.53  However, the court concluded that “accru-
al” could apply,54 because the legislature did not define “accrue,” and there-
fore, “accrual” was open for judicial interpretation.55  The court declined to 
apply the strict interpretation standard, but rather applied liberal construction 
as set forth by the Supreme Court of Missouri’s directive in O’Grady v. 
Brown – that “in order to promote the purpose and objectives of the Wrongful 
Death Act, the Act shall not be strictly construed.”56  The appellate court held 
the legislative time limitation in Section 537.100 did not accrue until, by rea-
sonable diligence, a cause of action for wrongful death could be ascertained.57 
The Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer of this case.58  The 
court affirmed the orders of the trial courts for judgment on the pleadings in 
favor of the hospital.59  The court held that the wrongful death claim accrued 
at the time of death, not eight years later when the cause of death was reason-
ably ascertained,60 and that common law maxims for fraudulent concealment, 
such as equitable estoppel, were not appropriate to toll statutory time-bar 
creations.61  The court further held that accrual should be interpreted under 
the strict interpretation standard set forth in a case from 1952, Frazee v. Part-
ney.62  The strict interpretation standard required the court to “construe the 
 
 50. Boland, 2013 WL 6170598, at *5. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at *10. 
 53. Id. (“[T]he Wrongful Death Act contains its own special statute of limita-
tions.  We agree with Respondents on that point and do not apply those provisions, as 
section 516.300 makes clear that the limitations contained within sections 516.010 to 
516.370 do not extend to this action.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (“Accrual is not defined within the Wrongful Death Act and, thus, is open 
to interpretation by the courts.”). 
 56. Id. at *6 (citing O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)). 
 57. Id. at *10. 
 58. Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 703 (Mo. 2015) 
(en banc). 
 59. Id. at 713. 
 60. Id. at 710; see Combined Substitute Brief of Respondents at 45, Boland, 471 
S.W.3d 703 (No. SC 93906), 2014 WL 3706775, at *45. 
 61. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 710. 
 62. Id. at 705. 
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cold, clear words of the statute” and refrain from judicial enlargement of the 
time limitation set forth by the statute.63 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Missouri has applied two lines of interpretation to wrongful death caus-
es of action.  The standard used significantly impacts the outcome of the 
wrongful death statute of limitations analysis.  One line reflects the harshness 
of the strict interpretation standard, while the liberal construction line allevi-
ates the severity of possible injustices through the application of judicially-
created common law maxims of estoppel.64  Because wrongful death causes 
of action were first considered “a purely statutory creature”65 of the legisla-
ture, early courts strictly construed wrongful death statutes, which resulted in 
harsh applications of the statute of limitations.66  However, when a court 
acknowledges that wrongful death causes of action existed at common law, it 
may depart from strict interpretation and apply a liberal construction stand-
ard.67  Statutes interpreted liberally gain the availability of common law max-
ims to prevent injustice and allow courts to appreciate the moral and ethical 
issues surrounding the statute.68  Missouri has consistently held that wrongful 
death causes of action are a statutory creation that did not exist at common 
law,69 but has fluctuated between which standard to apply – strict interpreta-
tion or liberal construction.70 
 
 63. Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915, 921 (Mo. 1958). 
 64. Gregory E. Maggs, Estoppel and Textualism, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 167, 167 
(2006). 
 65. State ex rel. Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d 434, 455 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) 
(Russel, J., dissenting). 
 66. See Mary C. Doesburg, Note, Wrongful Death Statute-Limitation of Actions-
Period within which Beneficiary Must Sue Still Strictly Construed, 42 MO. L. REV. 
496, 500 (1977). 
 67. See LaFage v. Jani, 766 A.2d 1066, 1077 (N.J 2001). 
68. See id. at 1076–80. 
 69. See, e.g., O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.3d 904, 907 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); 
State ex rel. Kan. City Stock Yards Co. of Me. v. Clark, 536 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Mo. 
1976) (en banc); Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Mo. 1958); Coover v. 
Moore, 31 Mo. 574, 574 (1862). 
 70. Compare Boland v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 705 (bar-
ring equitable estoppel in wrongful death actions concerning defendant’s use of 
fraudulent concealment), and Frazee, 314 S.W.2d at 919  (finding that wrongful death 
statutes did not provide for the tolling of statutes due to fraudulent concealment), with 
Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 441 (allowing equitable estoppel to bar the defense of time 
limitations), and O’Grady, 654 S.W.3d at 911 (creating a liberal construction stand-
ard for wrongful death statutory interpretation). 
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A.  Statutory Creation 
The traditional rule, that a cause of action for wrongful death is purely a 
statutory creation and has no roots in common law, can be traced back to 
1808 in the English case of Baker v. Bolton.71  In dictum, and without cited 
authority or supported reasoning, Lord Ellenborough created “Baker’s Rule,” 
which stated, “[i]n a civil court, the death of a human being could not be 
complained of as an injury.”72  The English remedied the absence of a wrong-
ful death cause of action with legislation.73  The Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 
more commonly known as Lord Campbell’s Act,74 provided “a distinct reme-
dy for wrongful death in favor of designated members of the deceased’s fami-
ly.”75  The preamble of this Act reflected the drafters belief that no common 
law precedent for wrongful death existed.76  
 
 71. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 382–83 (1970) (citing 
Baker v. Bolton (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 1033); see Dennis M. Doiron, A Better Inter-
pretation of the Wrongful Death Act, 43 ME. L. REV. 449, 453 (1991); Daniel J. 
Scheffner, Taking Wrongful Death Seriously: Dworkinian Interpretivism and the 
Common Law Right of Action for Wrongful Death, 5 FAULKNER L. REV. 223, 224 
(2014). 
 72. Glick v. Ballentine Produce Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609, 614 (Mo. 1965) (quoting 
Baker, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033), overruled on other grounds by Bennett v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 896 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. 1995) (en banc). 
 
It must be remembered that Baker v. Bolton was a nisi prius case, tried in the 
local court before a single judge rather than en banc in the superior court at 
Westminster.  The case involved only a small amount of money and apparent-
ly was not extensively argued.  Ellenborough’s reported opinion is very brief, 
and the controversial rule of law was laid down without either sustaining rea-
soning or supporting authority. 
 
Appellants’ Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal at 3, Glick, 396 S.W.2d 
609 (Mo. 1965) (No. 51298), 1966 WL 100819, at *3 (quoting TA Smedley, Wrong-
ful Death: Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605, 614–615 (1960)). 
 73. Steven H. Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions and Section 1983, 60 IND. L.J. 
559, 572–73 (1985). 
 74. Id. at 572. 
 75. Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 
1058 (1965). 
 76. Id.  There is some debate that Baker’s Rule sprang from penal felony murder.  
See id. at 1055; LaFage v. Jani, 766 A.2d 1066, 1076–77 (N.J. 2001) (citing F. 
POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 52–57 (Landon ed. 1951); W. Holdsworth, The Origin of 
the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REV. 431 (1916)). 
 
Under the felony-merger doctrine, no civil recovery was permitted under the 
common law for an act that constituted both a tort and a felony.  The felony 
was against the Crown and was deemed more serious than the tort, and thus 
the tort was merged into, or pre-empted by, the felony. 
 
Id. at 1077. 
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A few American jurisdictions, including Missouri,77 recognized com-
mon law wrongful death causes of action in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.78  However, the common law wheels of wrongful death 
jurisprudence ground to an abrupt halt when American courts first adopted 
Baker’s Rule in Carey v. Berkshire Railroad Co. in 1848.79  In Carey, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts applied Baker’s Rule to a wrongful 
death action and denied relief to a widow in the negligent death case of her 
husband, a railroad employee.80   
The Supreme Court of the United States, in The Harrisburg, later cited 
Carey,81 and various state courts followed.82  As a result, American state leg-
islatures passed wrongful death statutes to alleviate the harshness of no re-
covery.83  Today, all fifty states have statutes for recovery under wrongful 
death causes of action.84 
The Missouri legislature enacted the state’s first wrongful death statute 
in 1855.85  Consequently, when Missouri courts applied the wrongful death 
statute, they considered the action to be substantive law86 and construed the 
statute strictly.87  Strict interpretation mandates that judicial construal is 
“bound to consider only the plain language . . . and the legislative intent that 
language evidenced.”88  Additionally, when reading and applying the statute, 
 
 77. See James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162, 164 (1853). 
 78. See, e.g., Gross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 90 (Conn. 1794); Ford v. Monroe, 20 
Wend. 210 (N.Y. 1838). 
 79. Carey v. Berkshire R.R. Co., 55 Mass. 475, 478 (1848), overruled in part by 
Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1972); see Doesburg, supra note 66, at 
497. 
 80. Carey, 55 Mass. at 475.  See Doiron, supra note 71, at 454. 
 81. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), overruled by Moragne v. States Marine 
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
 82. See Doiron, supra note 71, at 453–54. 
 83. See, e.g., Steinglass, supra note 73, at 573; Jonathan James, Comment, Deni-
al of Recovery to Nonresident Beneficiaries Under Washington’s Wrongful Death and 
Survival Statutes: Is It Really Cheaper to Kill A Man Than to Maim Him?, 29 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 663, 667 (2006). 
 84. See James, supra note 83, at 666–67. 
 85. MO. REV. STAT. § 3, p. 648 (1855) (current version at MO. REV. STAT. § 
537.080–.090 (2000)); see 5A JOHN A. BORRON, JR., MO. PRAC., PROBATE LAW & 
PRACTICE § 852 (3d ed.). 
 86. Coover v. Moore, 31 Mo. 574, 574 (1862).  In Coover, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri held that wrongful death was “purely a statutory right” and a common law 
cause of action did not exist for the “negligent killing of another.”  Id.  Coover also 
stated, “Penal statutes must be strictly construed.”  Id. 
 87. Cummins v. Kan. City Pub. Serv. Co., 66 S.W.2d 920, 925 (Mo. 1933); see 
also Michael T. Kokal, Note, Rambo I: The Missouri Supreme Court vs. the Wrongful 
Death Statute—Prelude to the Sequel?, 57 MO. L. REV. 321, 322–23 (1992) (discuss-
ing strict interpretation of wrongful death causes of action). 
 88. Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 709 (Mo. 2015) 
(en banc); see Maggs, supra note 64, at 167. 
9
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judicial analysis should not be influenced by policy arguments89 and judges 
should not “take it upon themselves to find exceptions, glosses, or creative 
interpretations of the plain meaning of statutes”90 – even when the conclusion 
reached is “distasteful.”91 
An excellent example of Missouri’s strict interpretation standard can be 
found in the 1958 Supreme Court of Missouri case Frazee v. Partney.92  In 
Frazee, a sleepy truck driver ran a car off the road and killed two of the car’s 
passengers, a mother and daughter.93  The truck driver failed to report the 
accident.94  The victims’ family filed a wrongful death cause of action once 
the identity of the driver became known; however, the suit commenced past 
the one-year statute of limitations due to the fraudulent concealment of the 
defendant’s identity.95  The Frazee court held that the wrongful death statute 
did not provide for the tolling of the statute of limitations due to fraud or con-
cealment and that a wrongful death cause of action accrued at death.96 
B.  Discovering Common Law Origins 
Other jurisdictions have analyzed the historical bedrocks of wrongful 
death causes of action and acknowledged that codification originated at 
common law before statutory creation.97  Missouri, however, has consistently 
held fast that wrongful death causes of action sprang from statutory creation 
rather than common law. 
Missouri first confronted the idea of common law origination for wrong-
ful death actions in 1965 in Glik v. Ballentine Produce, Inc.98  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri addressed statutory criticism and defended Lord Camp-
bell’s Act because it was “accepted as a parliamentary recognition of the pre-
existing rule” and created a model for all ensuing statutory rights of wrongful 
 
 89. Maggs, supra note 64, at 167. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 711 (quoting Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 
314 (Mo. 1968) (en banc)). 
 92. See 314 S.W.2d 915, 921 (Mo. 1958). 
 93. Id. at 917. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 921. 
 97. LaFage v. Jani, 766 A.2d 1066, 1076–80 (N.J. 2001).  New Jersey is one of 
the more recent jurisdictions to recognize that wrongful death claims originated 
through common law and overrule all past cases that held wrongful death was a statu-
tory creation.  Id. at 1079; see, e.g., William S. Bailey, Flawed Justice: Limitation of 
Parental Remedies for the Loss of Consortium of Adult Children, 27 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 941, 953 (2004). 
 98. Glick v. Ballentine Produce Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1965), overruled on 
other grounds by Bennett v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 896 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. 
1995) (en banc). 
10
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death recovery in Missouri.99  The court vehemently declined to overturn the 
long held view of statutory wrongful death based on “the scattered voices of 
protest and criticism.”100  The court firmly held, “There is no common law 
right of action for wrongful death in Missouri.”101  This early confrontation 
assisted in Missouri’s rejection of common law origination for wrongful 
death claims found five years later in other jurisdictions.102 
Cracks in the theory of wrongful death statutory creation began in 1970 
after the Supreme Court of the United States decided Moragne v. States Ma-
rine Lines, Inc.103  In Moragne, the Court evaluated historical applications of 
actions for wrongful death and determined the traditional justification for 
Baker’s Rule “never existed in this country.”104  The Court specifically over-
ruled its holding in The Harrisburg, which established the precedent for 
wrongful death actions not found under common law.105 
Following Moragne, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts over-
ruled Carey, the case that laid the foundation for Baker’s Rule in America.106  
In Gaudette v. Webb, the court held the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’s 
wrongful death recovery right originated at common law.107  Gaudette explic-
itly barred the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense because inter-
preting wrongful death statutes through the lens of common law allowed the 
general application of limitations, instead of merely specific limitations.108  
By allowing a general application, the court held that, when appropriate, the 
limitations could be tolled.109 
The Supreme Court of Missouri had the opportunity to change course 
and acknowledge common law origins in 1976 through Kansas City Stock 
Yards Co. of Maine v. Clark.110  In Kansas City Stock Yards, the court con-
sidered an untimely filing of a wrongful death claim and held fast to the ap-
 
 99. Id. at 614. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 402–03 
(1970); Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Mass. 1972); LaFage, 766 A.2d at 
1076–80. 
 103. 398 U.S. 375. 
 104. Id. at 381. 
 105. Id. at 409 (1970).  Although both Moragne and The Harrisburg dealt with 
maritime law, the Court ascertained the common law applicable on land also applied 
on sea.  State ex rel. Kan. City Stock Yards Co. of Me. v. Clark, 536 S.W.2d 142, 153 
(Mo. 1976) (en banc) (Bardgett, J., dissenting). 
 106. Kan. City Stock Yards, 536 S.W.2d at 154. 
 107. 284 N.E.2d 222, 229.  The court found that even if wrongful death causes of 
action began in statutory creation, wrongful death causes of action now “evolved to 
the point” that they should be considered common law.  Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 536 S.W.2d 142. 
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plication of strict interpretation and statutory creation precedent.111  The court 
reasoned the Missouri legislature’s 1967 amendment of the wrongful death 
statute could have provided inclusions that would alter the limitations.112 
In his dissent in Kansas City Stock Yards, Judge Bardgett looked back to 
a case decided in 1853, James v. Christy, which planted Missouri’s common 
law seeds two years prior to statutory creation.113  After a thorough historical 
analysis, Judge Bardgett concluded that the origin of a wrongful death claim 
was “firmly rooted” in common law.114 
In James, the Supreme Court of Missouri established that a father could 
sue the party responsible for the negligent death of his son.115  The court fur-
ther held the father could recover both non-pecuniary and non-economic 
damages “for the loss of society or comforts” of his son.116  The Supreme 
Court of the United States cited James as one of the early American “com-
mon-law courts against the [Baker] rule.”117 
C.  Missouri’s Liberal Interpretation Standard 
In 1983, the Supreme Court of Missouri finally changed course, rejected 
strict interpretation, and applied a liberal interpretation standard to a wrongful 
death cause of action in O’Grady v. Brown.118  The court held a stillborn, yet 
viable, fetus was considered a “person” under the wrongful death statute.119  
The opinion was written by Special Judge James A. Pudlowski,120 who held 
that the statute was intended to “mend the fabric of the common law” and 
promote the “apparent object of the legislative enactment.”121  The court set 
out three objectives of the statute: “(1) ‘to provide compensation to bereaved 
 
 111. Id. at 150 (Bardgett, J., dissenting)  “The principal opinion does not say in so 
many words that the Missouri wrongful death act must be strictly construed because it 
created a right of action nonexistent at common law, yet, that is the theory that per-
vades many of the earlier cases cited therein.”  Id. 
 112. The amendment occurred three years prior to Moragne.  See id. at 144; 
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
 113. See Kan. City Stock Yards, 536 S.W.2d at 151 (Badgett, J., dissenting) (citing 
James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162 (1853)); BORRON, supra note 85. 
 114. See Kan. City Stock Yards, 536 S.W.2d at 153 (Badgett, J., dissenting). 
 115. James, 18 Mo. at 164.  In James, the father perished before the adjudication 
of his case and an administrator pursued the cause of action after his demise; the court 
allowed the recovery of the son’s death to be passed to the administrator.  Id.  See 
Daniel J. Sheffner, Wrongful Death’s Common Law Antecedents in Missouri, 70 J. 
MO. B. 194, 196 (2014). 
 116. Sheffner, supra note 115, at 196 (quoting James, 18 Mo. at 164). 
 117. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 205 (1886), overruled by Moragne, 398 U.S. 
375. 
 118. 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). 
 119. Id. at 906–07. 
 120. Id. at 906.  Supreme Court of Missouri Judge Welliver did not sit on this 
case.  Id. at 912. 
 121. Id. at 908. 
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plaintiffs for their loss,’ (2) ‘to ensure that tortfeasors pay for the conse-
quences of their actions,’ and (3) ‘to deter harmful conduct which might lead 
to death.’”122  The O’Grady court, however, stopped short of accepting com-
mon law origination for wrongful death causes of action.123  
In Beisly v. Perigo, through a 4-3 majority opinion written by Judge 
George W. Draper, III, and decided with the assistance of a Special Judge, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri jumped the precedential hurdle of Frazee v. Part-
ney by distinguishing Beisly from it.124  The court held Frazee remained good 
law but was distinguished from this case because, in order to uphold the ob-
jectives created in O’Grady, fraudulent concealment blocked a defendant’s 
application of an affirmative defense based on time expiration.125 
Belinda Beisly was found dead in her home due to gunshot wounds on 
July 15, 2009.126  The State filed charges against her husband, Bob Beisly, 
and Jeremy Maples on February 13, 2013.127  Belinda’s mother brought a 
wrongful death claim after the three-year statute of limitations period and 
argued the statute of limitations should not be enforced due to fraudulent 
concealment.128  In this case, the husband purportedly hid his involvement in 
Belinda’s murder after another man, Maples, killed her.129  The husband 
claimed a home invasion occurred, lied to police, destroyed evidence, and 
denied involvement in Belinda’s death.130 
The court focused on the common law maxim that “fraud vitiates what-
ever it touches”131 as a fundamental tenet that has allowed estoppel to prevent 
an affirmative defense of the statute of limitations when arising from fraud.132  
The court reasoned the shield of estoppel neither tolled nor created an excep-
tion to the statute of limitations; estoppel simply prevented the murderer from 
 
 122. State ex rel. Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d. 434, 439 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) 
(quoting O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 909). 
 123. O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 908.   
 124. Ironically, Judge Draper wrote the dissent in Boland.  Boland v. St. Luke’s 
Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d. 703, 703 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).  Atypically, O’Grady 
was also decided with the assistance of a Special Judge.  O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 
906.  Supreme Court of Missouri Judge Welliver did not sit on this case.  Id. at 912. 
 125. Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 440. 
 126. Id. at 447. 
 127. Id.  Maples was charged with first-degree murder.  Id. at 436.  Beisly was 
charged with aiding and encouraging Maples.  Id.  Charges against Beisly were even-
tually dropped.  Jeff Lehr, Husband’s Charge Dropped in Vernon County Murder 
Case, JOPLIN GLOBE (Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://www.joplinglobe.com/news/local_news/husband-s-charge-dropped-in-vernon-
county-murder-case/article_d3cb8199-c033-5efe-b27d-1df52d7dfb6f.html. 
 128. Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 446. 
 129. Id. at 447. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 442 (quoting Cox v. Upjohn Co., 913 S.W.2d 225, 231 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1995)). 
 132. Id. 
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using the time limitation as a defense.133  This analysis allowed the court to 
remain within its constitutional bounds by not creating an exception to a leg-
islatively created statute of limitations.134  The court then applied Missouri 
Revised Statutes Section 1.010,135 the common law reception statute, in an 
effort to liberally construe and interweave O’Grady’s instruction136 into the 
legislature’s intent.137  The court reasoned that Section 1.010 provides, “all 
acts of the general assembly, or laws, shall be liberally construed, so as to 
effectuate the true intent and meaning thereof,” and therefore, equitable es-
toppel should be “interweaved” in order to foil fraudulent concealment.138 
Beisly provided two dissenting opinions.  The first discussed why the 
court should not have decided this case in a manner that contradicted the de-
cision reached on the very same day in Boland.139  Judge Zel M. Fischer ad-
monished the Beisly plurality for reaching a 4-3 majority decision only with 
the assistance of a Special Judge in light of the full “regular” court’s decision 
in Boland.140  In addition, Judge Fischer reasoned Beisly should not have 
been decided at all because it only appeared before the court on a writ of pro-
hibition while Boland reached the court through a direct appeal.141  Beisly 
will now return to the trial court without clear direction; the trial judge must 
decide whether to apply Beisly or Boland.142  Judge Mary Rhodes Russell 
penned the second dissenting opinion; she authored the majority opinion in 
Boland.143 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that the com-
mon law maxim of equitable estoppel did not bar the defendant’s defense of 
time limitation when the defendant’s fraudulent acts concealed the tortious 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 444.  The Separation of Powers provision is provided by the Missouri 
Constitution, Article II, Section I.  Id. at 443. 
 135. MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.010 (West 2016).  “Section 1.010 expressly provides 
that ‘all acts of the general assembly, or laws, shall be liberally construed, so as to 
effectuate the true intent and meaning thereof.’”  Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 444 (quoting § 
1.010.1). 
 136. O’Grady instructed courts “to perceive the import of major legislative inno-
vations and to interweave the new legislative policies with the inherited body of 
common law principles.”  Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 444 (quoting O’Grady v. Brown, 654 
S.W.2d 904, 908 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)). 
 137. Id. at 444. 
 138. Id. (quoting § 1.010.1). 
 139. Id. at 445–46 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 446. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 445; Boland v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 704–05 
(Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
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nature of the deaths.144  The court further held that accrual for wrongful death 
claims began the instant the decedent died as opposed to the moment the 
cause of action was discovered.145 
A.  The Majority Opinion 
The court declined to follow the more recent, liberal interpretation craft-
ed in O’Grady v. Brown146 and relied on a case from 1952, Frazee v. Part-
ney,147 to determine that accrual for a wrongful death statute began at the 
moment of death and that statutory interpretation should be strictly con-
strued.148 
The Boland court addressed the issue of delayed accrual and looked to 
the analysis in Frazee to determine when time limitations began to run.149  
The court had to determine if accrual began at the moment of death or at the 
point the lawsuit could be “effectively commenced.”150  The court rejected 
O’Grady’s holding that “the wrongful death statute was not in derogation of 
the common law and should be construed ‘with a view to promoting the ap-
parent object of the legislative enactment.’”151  The court reasoned O’Grady 
did not analyze the statute of limitations and because Frazee did, Frazee re-
mained controlling precedent.152  Like in Frazee, the Boland court held that 
“despite the harshness of the outcome, the wrongful death claim accrued at 
the moment of death.”153 
The Boland court then looked at the application of estoppel to bar the 
defendants the defense of time due to fraudulent concealment.154  The court 
reasoned estoppel application equated to a “de facto exception to section 
537.100 for fraudulent concealment.”155  The court noted the tragic circum-
stances of Boland created a compelling policy argument, but that a “free-
wheeling” method to statutory interpretation “[was] also troubling,” especial-
ly when precedent advised a contrary outcome.156  The Boland court again 
turned to Frazee for analysis of statutory interpretation.157 
The Boland court noted Section 537.100, the statute of limitations for 
wrongful death, contained a “special statute of limitation” that “must carry its 
 
 144. Boland, 471 S.W.3d. at 712–13. 
 145. Id. at 710. 
 146. 654 S.W.3d 904, 911–12 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). 
 147. 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958). 
 148. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 708–09. 
 149. Id. at 708. 
 150. Id. (citing Frazee, 314 S.W.2d at 917). 
 151. Id. at 709 (quoting O’Grady, 654 S.W.3d at 908). 
 152. Id. at 715 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 708–09 (majority opinion) (citing Frazee, 314 S.W.2d at 921). 
 154. Id. at 710. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 711. 
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own exceptions and [the court] may not engraft others upon it.”158  Section 
537.100 creates a specific time limitation for two reasons,159 neither of which 
allows exceptions for fraudulent concealment.  Chapter 516 is the general 
statutes of limitations chapter and does carry a fraudulent concealment excep-
tion in Missouri Revised Statutes Section 516.280.160  The court stated, “The 
principles of the legislative deference as well as stare decisis must be respect-
ed.”161  Like in Frazee, the court held in Boland that a general exception was 
not applicable when a special exception was present.162 
The court then analyzed the legislative intent behind the wrongful death 
statutory scheme.163  The court also noted the presumption of legislative ac-
tion in light of “full awareness and complete knowledge of the present state 
of the law.”164  The court reasoned the legislature could have created a fraud-
ulent concealment exception in light of Frazee but instead chose to expand 
the limitation period twice.165  The court held, “Our function is to interpret 
the law; it is not to disregard the law as written by the General Assembly.”166 
B.  The Dissent 
In his dissent, Judge Draper, joined by Judge Stith and Judge Teitelman, 
concurred with the majority’s holding that Frazee remained valid prece-
dent.167  The dissent agreed the cause of action for wrongful death accrued at 
the decedent’s death168 and that Section 537.100169 lacked an overt tolling 
exception in connection with a tortfeasor’s fraudulent concealment.170 
Judge Draper stated the majority erred by not applying the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel to bar the hospital from using the statute of limitations as 
 
 158. Id. (quoting Frazee, 314 S.W.2d at 919). 
 159. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.100 (2000).  This statute defines limitation periods 
and details the two special limitations; one is a tolling provision for defendants who 
abscond from the state to avoid service, and the other is a one-year savings provision 
if the Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer after opinion by the court of ap-
peals in accordance with MO. CONST. art. V, § 10. 
 160. MO. REV. STAT. § 516.280 (2000). 
 161. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 711. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 712–13. 
 164. Id. at 713 (quoting State v. Rumble, 680 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Mo. 1984) (en 
banc)). 
 165. Id.  The legislature expanded the wrongful death time limitation “first from 
one year to two years in 1967, then to three years in 1979.”  Id. 
 166. Id. at 711 (quoting Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Mo. 1968) 
(en banc)). 
 167. Id. at 713 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
 168. Id. 
 169. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.100 (2000). 
 170. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 713 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
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an affirmative defense, as found in the reasoning of Beisly.171  The dissent 
contended that the precedent of strict interpretation applied in Frazee should 
not be followed; rather, stare decisis demanded that the objectives created in 
O’Grady be allowed to construe the limitations liberally.172  By applying 
Section 1.010, the court could interweave the common law maxims of equita-
ble estoppel as a shield to bar the affirmative defense of the statute of limita-
tions due to the defendant’s fraudulent concealment.173 
Finally, the dissent argued the application of equitable estoppel did not 
engraft a “‘de facto exception’ onto section 537.100” because it did not affect 
accrual at death for wrongful death claims or toll the statute of limitations.174  
The dissent contended the principal opinion’s interpretation of the statute 
“[led] to an illogical and absurd result” because fraudulent concealment al-
lows tortfeasors to escape liability.175 
V.  COMMENT 
The Supreme Court of Missouri should recognize that the legislature did 
not originate the field of wrongful death recovery by the passage of the 
Wrongful Death Act in 1855.176  In both cases, Boland and Beisly, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri should have ruled in favor of wrongful death’s 
common law existence for two reasons: precedent and legislative intent.  Be-
cause Missouri does not recognize common law existence in wrongful death 
cases, lower courts are now trapped between two contradictory decisions 
without clear precedential guidance.  Until the dueling decisions are recon-
ciled or one is overruled, lower courts are left in limbo and must choose be-
tween the strict and narrow or liberal and broad.  The recognition and applica-
tion of common law would provide judicial stability, flexibility, and strong 
direction for future wrongful death causes of action. 
  
 
 171. Id. at 713–14. 
 172. Id. at 715. 
 173. Id. at 718. 
 174. Id. at 719. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162, 162 (1853). 
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A.  Precedent 
For the past sixty years, two distinct lines of reasoning have surfaced: a 
defendant-friendly line and a plaintiff-friendly line.177  The defendant-
friendly line, reflected in Boland, is based on the use of strict interpretation 
and focuses on the “plain language of the legislature.”  Regardless of the rea-
son for bringing suit past the legislatively determined time limit, courts must 
strictly interpret the statute of limitations.178  This strict interpretation line 
outright bars claims brought beyond the three-year statute of limitations cre-
ated by the legislature.  Strict interpretation seeks only to extract the objective 
meaning behind legislative intent.179 
The plaintiff-friendly line, reflected in Beisly, is based on liberal con-
struction standards180 and considers both policy issues and common law max-
ims of equity that allow estoppel to bar the statute of limitations defense 
when necessary.181  This line, therefore, focuses on unearthing the subjective 
reasoning behind the late filing of a wrongful death claim and prevents injus-
tice.182 
Both the Boland and Beisly courts relied on precedent to determine the 
proper standard of interpretation.  The Boland court recognized that Frazee v. 
Partney, a case from over half a century ago, remained good law. 183   Nota-
bly, Frazee was decided before the critical shift toward the application of 
common law existence in wrongful death claims.184  Frazee followed a line of 
cases that strictly interpreted the application of the statute of limitations to 
wrongful death claims because the statute was theoretically created solely by 
legislation.185  The strict interpretation standard served as a restraint on the 
court’s ability to apply common law maxims to extended statutory deadlines 
and prevent injustice.186  On the other hand, Beisly relied on modern prece-
 
 177. Compare Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 713–14 (barring the application of the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel in wrongful death actions concerning defendant’s use of 
fraudulent concealment), and Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915, 915 (Mo. 1958) 
(finding that wrongful death statutes do not provide for the tolling of statutes due to 
fraudulent concealment), with State ex rel. Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d 434, 436 
(Mo. 2015) (en banc) (allowing the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar the defense 
of time limitations), and O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.3d 904 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) 
(creating a liberal construction standard for wrongful death causes of action). 
 178. See Maggs, supra note 64, at 167. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 443–44. 
 181. See Maggs, supra note 64, at 167–68. 
 182. Id. at 172. 
 183. Boland v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 708–09 (Mo. 2015) 
(en banc) (citing Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958)). 
 184. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 408–09 (1970). 
 185. See Doiron, supra note 71, at 457–58. 
 186. See id. at 453. 
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dent, the case of O’Grady v. Brown.187  O’Grady applied a liberal interpreta-
tion standard in construing a wrongful death cause of action; this allowed the 
court analytical flexibility.188 
Neither court, Boland nor Beisly, overruled Frazee as they should have.  
Frazee’s strict interpretation standard directly conflicts with the liberal con-
struction standard of O’Grady.  The Missouri Court of Appeals for the West-
ern District reasoned that O’Grady overruled Frazee sub silentio.189  Howev-
er, both the Boland and Beisly courts held that Frazee remained good law.190  
The Supreme Court of Missouri “is presumed not to be overruled sub silen-
tio,” and since O’Grady did not expressly overrule Frazee, the case remained 
good law.191  Both courts distinguished O’Grady from Frazee because the 
statutes of limitations were not at issue in O’Grady.192 
Technically, the Boland court, despite the harshness, came to the correct 
conclusion through a strict interpretation analysis because Frazee cannot re-
main good law in the presence of a liberal interpretation analysis.  The Beisly 
court’s liberal construction must fall if Frazee remains good law.  Frazee 
requires the court to disregard intentional acts of fraudulent concealment by a 
defendant when the statute of limitations surpasses the time limit created by 
the legislature.  However, finding common law existence in wrongful death 
claims would overrule Frazee because the “underpinning for the English 
rule”193 would be condemned.  Common law application would open the door 
for stare decisis to follow O’Grady’s liberal construction standards and allow 
the court to apply judicially-created common law maxims when justice de-
mands. 
B.  Legislative Interpretation 
Legislative intent is the key to interpreting complex statutes.194  In inter-
preting the wrongful death statute, courts should remember that the purpose 
of the statute is to provide compensation for the loss of companionship and 
support from a loved one who would be alive if not for the defendants’ ac-
 
 187. State ex rel. Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d 434, 439–40 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) 
(citing O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)). 
 188. O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 904. 
 189. Boland v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 709; Beisly, 469 
S.W.3d at 440.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “sub silentio” as, “Under silence; 
without notice being taken; without being expressly mentioned.”  Sub Silentio, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 190. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 709; Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 440. 
 191. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 709. 
 192. Id.; Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 440. 
 193. LaFage v. Jani, 766 A.2d 1066, 1076–80 (N.J. 2001). 
 194. Michael Sinclair, “Only A Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling 
Canons,” One to Seven, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 919, 923 (2006). 
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tions.195  Boland’s decision did not uphold the purpose of the wrongful death 
act, but the Beisly decision did. 
The Boland court relied on imperfect reasoning to support legislative in-
tent.  The Boland court determined the legislature could have created a fraud-
ulent concealment exception in light of Frazee but instead chose to expand 
the limitation period.196  Three reasons disturb this analysis: the timing of the 
legislative amendments, the presumption of legislative awareness, and the 
liberal interpretation standard provided by O’Grady. 
First, the legislature’s initial amendment to the wrongful death statute 
occurred fifteen years after the court decided Frazee.197  Second, the court 
noted the presumption of legislative action in light of “full awareness and 
complete knowledge of the present state of the law.”198  Under this reasoning, 
the legislature would need to be aware of a single case, Frazee. Commenta-
tors have pointed out that it is illogical to assume that legislature takes notice 
of every single ruling, and the legislative presumption may be outdated due to 
the proliferation of judicial decisions.199  In addition, it is highly unlikely the 
small handful of plaintiffs denied wrongful death claims would lobby the 
legislature for change.200  Lastly, even if the legislature had been aware of 
Frazee, the O’Grady decision in 1983 would have caused legislative confu-
sion because O’Grady would have trumped strict interpretation standards and 
allowed a liberal construction to apply common law maxims, such as equita-
ble estoppel, to alleviate the harsh injustice of impossible time limitations. 
Boland frustrates the very purpose of the wrongful death statute.  Ac-
cording to Boland, defendants can hide facts surrounding their actions for 
three years plus one day and never be held accountable for a wrongful death 
claim through civil proceedings.  Judge Cardozo once stressed there was a 
need to protect the rights of an innocent yet tardy plaintiff.201  The court can-
not rectify the deterrence and compensatory purpose of the wrongful death 
statute by allowing tortfeasors to escape liability when they hide tortious con-
duct or evidence. 
The Beisly court upheld the purpose of the statute but engrafted an ex-
ception onto the wrongful death statute of limitations.  Beisly relied on equi-
table estoppel to bar the defendant from escaping liability.202  A basic com-
 
 195. O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (citing MO. 
REV. STAT. § 537.090). 
 196. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 713.  In Boland, the court noted that subsequent to 
Frazee, the General Assembly twice amended Section 537.100.  Id.  “[F]irst from one 
year to two years in 1967, then to three years in 1979.”  Id. 
 197. Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958). 
 198. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 713 (quoting State v. Rumble, 680 S.W.2d 939, 942 
(Mo. 1984) (en banc)). 
 199. See, e.g., Kokal, supra note 87, at 338 & n.153. 
 200. Doesburg, supra note 66, at 505. 
 201. Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 541 (1915). 
 202. State ex rel. Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d 434, 440 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
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mon law maxim is that no person should benefit from fraud.203  This maxim 
is “deeply rooted in this country’s jurisprudence and older than the country 
itself.”204  Equitable estoppel is a judicial creation for obliterating injustice.205  
Equitable estoppel prevents a defendant from using the statute of limitations 
as an affirmative defense to a claim when fraudulent concealment occurs.206  
It is only invoked when a defendant intentionally takes active steps to camou-
flage tortious conduct.207   
The Beisly court reasoned the shield of estoppel did not toll or create an 
exception to the statute of limitations; estoppel simply barred time limitation 
as a defense.208  This reasoning presumably allowed the court to remain with-
in Missouri’s constitutional bounds209 by applying Section 1.010210 to “inter-
weave” equitable estoppel in order to foil fraudulent concealment.211  How-
ever, the equitable estoppel distinction is “a distinction without a real differ-
ence”212 and does engraft an exception onto the statute that skates past legiti-
mate restrictions.213  For that reason, Beisly must once again fail. 
Statutes of limitations are imperfect.214  They are “artificial constraints” 
used to restrict a party’s time to sue.215  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once 
asked, “[W]hat is the justification for depriving a man of his rights, a pure 
evil as far as it goes, in consequence of the lapse of time?”216  The function of 
a statute of limitations is protection for the defendant against stale claims,217 
whereas the function of a wrongful death statute is compensation, accounta-
bility, and deterrence.  Statutes of limitations promote injustice when applied 
severely.218 
Acknowledgement that wrongful death claims originated through com-
mon law and were not created entirely through legislation would allow the 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Maggs, supra note 64, at 171. 
 206. Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 440. 
 207. Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 208. Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 440–44. 
 209. Id. at 443–44; see MO. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 210. MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.010 (West 2016) (providing that “all acts of the general 
assembly, or laws, shall be liberally construed, so as to effectuate the true intent and 
meaning thereof”). 
 211. Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 444. 
 212. Id. at 456. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Henry G. Miller, Statute of Limitations: An Immoral Defense?, 83-APR N.Y. 
ST. B.J. 24, 29, 31 (2011). 
 215. Id. at 26. 
 216. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 
(1897). 
 217. W. Dudley McCarter, Missouri Statutes of Limitation, 54 J. MO. B. 35, 35 
(1998). 
 218. See Miller, supra note 214, at 31. 
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courts to apply estoppel in order to alleviate the harshness and injustice of an 
arbitrary time limitation and remain within constitutional bounds.  The “geni-
us of our common law” has been in creating “ways to provide a remedy for 
the wrongs that afflict us.”219  Following the example of Massachusetts’s 
Gaudette v. Webb,220 common law beginnings would allow a firmer founda-
tion for the court to apply the general exception for fraudulent concealment 
found in Section 516.280.221   Common law roots allow the courts to consider 
the general, rather than special, statute of limitations222 because the limitation 
period would become procedural rather than substantive.223  The limitation 
should be suspended or disregarded when conditions or circumstances justify 
expanding a time limitation.224  Therefore, defendants should not be allowed 
to use time limitations as a defense against a wrongful death cause of action 
when they hide actions that cause the death of a loved one. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Missouri must act with swiftness and remedy the 
disharmony created by the dueling decisions. In order to uphold the objec-
tives created in O’Grady and to prevent injustice, the court should follow the 
path unveiled by other jurisdictions and acknowledge that wrongful death 
claims originated in common law.225  Missouri’s common law roots of 
wrongful death causes of action predate the legislative creation of the wrong-
ful death statute and create a stronger basis supporting a liberal interpretation 
than currently provided by Beisly.226 
Boland’s return to the strict interpretation standard moves Missouri back 
in time,227 disregards the central compensatory purpose behind the statute,228 
and provides escape from liability by fraudulently concealing tortious con-
duct.229  Courts should not lightly overrule decades of precedent, but the bur-
den of wrongful death time limitation reform has clearly fallen upon this 
court.  Hard cases make bad law,230 but they do not have to.  The impact of 
this bad law should be limited by the court through uncovering Missouri’s 
common law origins in wrongful death causes of action. 
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 223. Doiron, supra note 71, at 453. 
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 225. See, e.g., LaFage v. Jani, 766 A.2d 1066, 1076–80 (N.J. 2001); Bailey, supra 
note 97, at 953. 
 226. See Sheffner, supra note 115, at 198. 
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